

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"Midnight Confessions": The Effect of Chronotype Asynchrony on Admissions of Wrongdoing

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Confession evidence is highly incriminating in court. We examined the interaction between chronotype and time of day on the confession decisions of 60 participants using an experimental paradigm. Pre-identified morning- and evening-type people were randomly assigned to participate in morning or evening sessions. Results supported an interactional asynchrony hypothesis that individuals are more likely to confess during "off-peak" periods (i.e., evening-types in the morning and morning-types in the evening). This interaction was obtained for both high- and low-seriousness transgressions. These results suggest that chronotype asynchrony constitutes a significant risk factor for false confessions and the wrongful convictions that often follow.

In the criminal justice system, confession evidence is highly incriminating—and yet fallible. Accordingly, it is important to understand factors that contribute to suspects' general willingness to offer admissions of guilt. Indeed, research has demonstrated myriad factors, both dispositional and situational, that influence individuals' willingness to confess.

For example, research shows that certain types of suspects are particularly vulnerable to influence under pressure—namely, juveniles (Drizin & Colgan, 2004; Owen-Kostelnik, Reppucci, & Meyer, 2006), individuals who are intellectually impaired (Everington & Fulero, 1999; Gudjonsson & Clare, 1995; Perske, 2004), individuals with certain types of psychological disorders (Redlich, 2007), and those with personality factors associated with compliance and suggestibility (Gudjonsson, 1991). Research also shows that certain police interrogation tactics can increase the likelihood of a confession—in particular, prolonged isolation, the presentation of false evidence, and the types of minimization themes that imply leniency (see Kassin et al., 2010). The underlying processes have been discussed in terms of social influence and persuasion (Davis & O'Donahue, 2004), temporal discounting in decision making (Madon, Guyll, Scherr, Greathouse, & Wells, 2012), and ego depletion and other aspects of self-regulation failure (Davis & Leo, 2012; for reviews, see Gudjonsson, 2003; Kassin, 2008; Kassin et al., 2010; Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). To further complicate matters, research also shows that confessions are especially problematic for a suspect's fate because such statements can increase the likelihood of conviction by tainting other evidence (Kassin, Bogart, & Kerner, 2012) and set into motion various forensic confirmation biases (Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 2013).

Although a good deal of research has focused on dispositional and situational factors that influence the decision to confess, there is a relative paucity of research examining the *interaction* of person and situation factors (e.g., Redlich & Goodman, 2003). One potentially important interactional factor concerns the time of day

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or night at which a suspect is interrogated in relation to his or her chronotype—that is, the time of day at which he or she experiences peak levels of psychological and physiological functioning (Horne & Ostberg, 1976; Roenneberg, Wirz-Justice, & Merrow, 2003). Individual differences in chronotype are related to a host of factors including age, work schedules, and biological makeup (Katzenberg et al., 1998).

Individuals who wake up and go to sleep relatively early, and thus experience their optimal level of alertness earlier in the day, are referred to as "larks." Those who wake up and go to sleep relatively late, and thus experience their optimal level of alertness later in the day, are referred to as "owls" (Smith, Reilly, & Midkiff, 1989). Research has shown that larks are more alert early in the day (say, 8 a.m.), whereas owls are more alert later in the day (say, 8 p.m.; Matchock & Mordkoff, 2009). Indicating that chronicity has traitlike characteristics, research has also shown that larks are more conscientious (Tsaousis, 2010) and attain greater academic achievement (Preckel, Lipnevich, Schneider, & Roberts, 2011), whereas owls are more impulsive (Caci et al., 2005). Concerning the legal system, these results suggest that owls may engage in criminal activity more frequently (i.e., they are less conscientious), may be more willing to offer admissions during interrogations to escape a situation (i.e., they are more impulsive), or may exhibit some combination of these patterns.

Synchrony between one's preferred time of day and testing time has a measurable bearing on a range of cognitive activities that require vigilance (May & Hasher, 1998). Anderson, Petros, Beckwith, Mitchell, and Fritz (1991) found that when subjects were tested for their memory at 9 a.m., 2 p.m., and 8 p.m., larks performed worse as the day wore on, whereas owls performed better. In other studies as well, "off-peak" participants (e.g., owls in the morning; larks at night) have performed worse at strategic reasoning than "on-peak" participants (Dickinson & McElroy, 2012) and made poorer health decisions with both short- and long-term consequences (Wittmann, Dinich, Merrow, & Roenneberg, 2006). These findings suggest that off-peak participants resemble individuals with impaired aspects of cognitive functioning.

The cognitive fatigue that off-peak individuals exhibit has important implications for confession decisions. Research using an interrogation-related regulatory decline framework has suggested that several factors associated with cognitive fatigue and self-regulatory decline substantially undermine suspects' ability to resist compliance with requests for self-incriminatory information—factors such as severe fatigue, emotional distress, and sleep deprivation (Davis & Leo, 2012). The parallel between off-peak alertness and sleep-deprived performance is important because (a) according to Amnesty International, sleep deprivation has been used to "soften" prisoners of war for interrogation (Kassin et al., 2010); (b) research indicates that police often interrogate suspects at night and disrupt their sleep before questioning (Gudjonsson, 1993); and (c) controlled experiments have shown that sleep deprivation can heighten susceptibility to influence and impair decision-making abilities in complex tasks, not only among laboratory participants but in real-world settings involving doctors (Taffinder, McManus, Gul, Russell, & Darzi, 1998), motorists (Lyznicki, Doege, Davis, & Williams, 1998), and fighter pilots (Caldwell, Caldwell, Brown, & Smith, 2004). Because the range of the effects is varied, with studies showing that sleep deprivation impairs the ability to sustain attention and flexibility of thinking and that it increases suggestibility in response to leading questions (Blagrove, 1996; for a review, see Harrison & Horne, 2000), researchers have concluded that "overall sleep deprivation strongly impairs human functioning" (Pilcher & Huffcutt, 1996).

Additional evidence suggesting that cognitive fatigue can influence suspects' willingness to offer confessions is offered by research bearing on the effect of interrogation length on suspects' willingness to offer admissions of wrongdoing. Consistent with theoretical perspectives on the effect of interrogation length on suspects' willingness to confess (e.g., Kassin et al., 2010; Leo, 2008), research has demonstrated that lengthy interrogations increase the likelihood that individuals will offer admissions to wrongdoing (Madon, Yang, Smalarz, Guyll, & Scherr, 2013). This research suggests that suspects are more willing to offer admissions of wrongdoing across lengthy interrogations because suspects begin to view a confession as the only means in which they can escape the interrogation and fail to appreciate the long-term consequences of offering a confession. Thus, during lengthy interrogations, suspects may reach a threshold and become overwhelmed (psychologically, emotionally, and physically) and view a confession as an escape hatch from the unpleasant immediate environment.

In light of the foregoing research on impaired cognitive functioning and the fact that suspects often confess to escape an immediate unpleasant situation (Madon et al., 2013), we believe that "off peak" interrogations may increase suspects' willingness to confess. Drawing on past research, we administered a questionnaire designed to classify participants as owls or larks and randomly assigned them to participate in an experiment during an early morning hour or at night. Using a recently developed laboratory paradigm we then tested the *interactional asynchrony hypothesis* that participants tested during "off-peak" hours (when they are presumably more cognitively fatigued) are more likely to confess than those tested during "on-peak" hours (when they are presumably more cognitively alert).

RESEARCH OVERVIEW

To test the interactional asynchrony hypothesis, we employed a paradigm in which participants are asked to indicate whether they had ever engaged in 20 illegal and unethical behaviors (Madon et al., 2012; Madon et al., 2013). Research using this paradigm has reliably demonstrated the effect of temporal discounting processes on confession decisions. That is, individuals' confession decisions are disproportionately influenced by an immediate, proximal consequence than by a distal consequence (e.g., individuals will risk meeting with a police officer at a later point in time about their admissions of engaging in illegal behaviors instead of immediately answering a large number of additional—but mundane—questions on a computer). Temporal discounting processes thus operate during confession decisions and lead individuals to focus on short-term contingencies and undermine their ability to give proper consideration to distal consequences. Based on research showing that individuals offer admissions to escape an immediate negative situation regardless of the distal consequence, and to employ a situation that most closely mimics an actual interrogation setting, we used a contingency pairing in which participants were told that admissions increased their odds of having to meet with a police officer at a later point and that denials would require them at the moment to answer a long and repetitive series of additional questions.

In this paradigm, participants' responses to the criminal and unethical behaviors are framed as admissions or denials. It is important to note, however, that it is not possible to determine the ground truth of any particular admission or denial.

METHOD

Participants

Sixty undergraduates enrolled in psychology courses at two midwestern universities participated to fulfill course requirements. Participants included 38 women and 22 men with an average age of 20.8. All participants were native English speakers, and the sample consisted of 58 European Americans, one participant who self-identified as being multiethnic, and one participant who did not report an ethnic identification.

Design

The experiment employed a 2 (chronotype: lark vs. owl) $\times$ 2 (time of testing: morning vs. night) $\times$ 2 (interview phase: first half vs. second half) quasi-experimental design in which interview phase was a within-subjects factor. Participants were recruited on the basis of their responses to a pretest assessment used to classify individuals as larks or owls. Participants who were not classified as either a lark or an owl were not recruited for experimental sessions. To eliminate the potential for self-selection, participants first agreed to take part in the study after which they were randomly assigned to either an early morning session (7:30 a.m.) or an evening session (7:30 p.m.).[1] As such, participants could not assign themselves to a time of day condition. We operationalized alertness or "synchrony" as an interaction between chronotype and time of day (i.e., owls participating during morning sessions and larks during evening sessions constituted the off-peak cells). During each session, participants responded to 20 interview questions always presented in the same order. The consequences participants were faced with differed depending on their responses to the 20 interview questions and mimicked suspects' experiences during an actual interrogation. Each time participants responded with a denial, they received the immediate consequence of having to answer 32 additional questions. Each time they responded with an admission, the likelihood that they would have to meet with a police officer in the future to discuss their responses—that is, delayed consequences—increased.

Materials

Chronotype questionnaire. The Morningness Composite Scale (Smith et al., 1989) was administered online. Participants responded to 13 questions designed to assess the time during which an individual experiences his or her peak level of functioning (e.g., "How alert do you feel during the first half hour after having awakened in the morning?"; "One hears about 'morning' and 'evening' types of people. Which ONE of these types do you consider yourself to be?"; "If you always had to rise at 6:00 AM, what do you think it would be like?"). Ten of the questions were followed by a 4-point response option scale; the other three were followed by a 5-point response option scale. Following the approach used in previous research (e.g., Hahn et al., 2012; May & Hasher, 1998; May, Hasher, & Foong, 2005; Smith et al., 1989), participants' responses were scored and combined to identify larks ($n = 34$; scores of 44 or higher) and owls ($n = 26$; scores of 22 or lower). These values have been empirically determined to capture the unique differences that separate these two groups from individuals who are not larks or owls (Hahn et al., 2012; May et al., 2005). The composite scale demonstrated a high level of reliability ($\alpha = .87$).

[1]We had sought to test participants earlier in the morning and later at night, but the Institutional Review Board did not permit experimental sessions to be scheduled at these hours.

Interview questions. Participants were asked whether they had engaged in 20 criminal and unethical behaviors (e.g., tried or used illegal drugs; vandalized property; shoplifted; illegally downloaded music, movies, or software; see the Appendix). These questions were drawn from previous research designed to assess criminal decision making among college students (McCoy et al., 2006) and were later adapted for research examining temporal discounting processes during confession decision making (Madon et al., 2012; Madon et al., 2013). For each item, they either admitted (scored as 1) or denied (scored as 0) having ever engaged in the behavior. The total number of admissions made was summed for each participant.

Repetitive questions. Participants also responded to 32 repetitive questions each time a denial response was given. Half of these questions assessed how the typical American would feel while engaging in the specific criminal or unethical behavior (e.g., Thinking about the average American . . . "How [emotion] do you think the typical American would feel while being publicly intoxicated?"). The other half of the questions assessed how a typical person from a specific state would feel while engaging in the specific criminal or unethical behavior (e.g., Thinking about the average Michiganian . . . "How [emotion] do you think the typical Michiganian would feel while being publicly intoxicated?"). All 32 questions were presented on a computer specifically programmed for a 4-s delay between questions. It took roughly 7 min to complete each repetitive question set. Thus, if a participant's responses necessitated answering the repetitive questions for all 20 questions (i.e., if a participant did not offer any admissions), the interview would have lasted approximately 140 min. Because these repetitive questions were not relevant to the aims of the research, but rather were employed to create an interrogation-like situation, we did not actually record or analyze these data.

Perceived seriousness. To examine the possible effect of the perceived seriousness of the criminal and unethical behaviors on participants' responses, we used previously assessed perceived seriousness ratings of each question (Madon et al., 2013, Experiment 2). For example, the questions "Have you ever driven a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any other drug like marijuana, cocaine, LSD, etc.?" and "Have you ever tried, used, or experimented with any illegal drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, crack, LSD, or any other illegal drug?" were perceived as being more serious than "Have you ever jumped or cut in line such as at the dining hall, movie theater, or grocery store?" and "Have you ever transported fireworks across state lines?" Incorporating these perceived seriousness ratings allowed us to test whether the predicted effects, if obtained, are limited to transgressions that are not serious in nature.

We also examined if there were differences between the perceived seriousness of the first 10 and second 10 questions. We averaged and compared the perceived seriousness ratings of the two sets and found no significant difference between the first half questions ($M = 4.07$, $SD = 1.33$) and the second half ($M = 3.80$, $SD = 0.797$), $t(18) = 0.57$, $p = .58$; 95% CI [–.75, 1.31].

Manipulation and suspicion checks. To ensure that participants understood the implications of making an admission, they were asked to report the consequences of their responses and whether they were (a) told they would be signed up to meet with an officer if they *had* engaged in the behaviors assessed, (b) told they would be signed up to meet with an officer if they *had not* engaged in the behaviors assessed, or (c) *never* told that they might have to meet with a police officer. At the end of each session, participants were asked if they believed they were misled during the experiment and given an opportunity to indicate any suspicions—especially with regard to the distal consequence.

Procedure

After participants were tested and classified as larks or owls, they were recruited via e-mail and randomly assigned to participate early in the morning or at night. After providing informed consent, participants, run individually, were instructed via the following cover story:

> I'm going to ask you some yes/no questions that will assess whether or not you've ever engaged in a variety of criminal and unethical behaviors. Every time you answer NO to one of these questions, you'll be asked some additional follow-up questions in order to get some more information. You'll answer these additional questions on the computer during your session today. On the other hand, if you tend to answer YES to the questions I ask you, then I will sign you up to meet with one of the police officers involved in this research to discuss your answers in more detail. We're doing this to get more information about people's criminal behaviors. So, let's see . . . you would meet with Officer Schiller. Assuming that your score requires that you have this meeting, he would contact you in the next few weeks to set things up. These appointments have generally lasted about an hour. So, basically, if you answer YES a lot, you'll need to meet with Officer Schiller.

Thus, participants were explicitly told that each admission increased their chance of a later meeting with a

police officer; each denial meant they had to answer an additional question set. Participants' responses were recorded throughout the interview. After completion of all questions, participants were probed for suspicion and fully debriefed.

RESULTS

Preliminary Analysis

Manipulation and suspicion checks. A total of five participants incorrectly understood the implications of their responses to the interview questions. Removing these participants had no effect on the pattern or significance of our findings, so their data were included in all analyses. No participants indicated suspicion about the distal consequence.

Main Analyses

We tested our hypothesis within a 2 (chronotype) × 2 (time of day) × 2 (interview phase) analysis of variance in which chronicity and time of day were between-subjects variables; interview phase served as a within-subjects variable. Our dependent measure was the total number of admissions made.

Results indicated that owls made significantly more admissions than larks did ($M = 11.04$, $SD = 3.85$ vs. $M = 9.85$, $SD = 3.69$), $F(1, 56) = 5.56$, $p = .02$, $\eta^2 = .090$, suggesting that owls, because of their impulsivity, lack of conscientiousness, or both, are more willing to offer admissions during an interrogation. Although there was not a significant main effect for time of day, $F(1, 56) = 1.49$, $p = .23$, $\eta^2 = .026$, results also strongly supported our Chronotype × Time of Day asynchrony interaction hypothesis, $F(1, 56) = 12.24$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2 = .179$ (see Figure 1). To fully understand this observed interaction and to test the hypothesis that individuals were more willing to offer admissions during an off-peak time of day in which they experience a diminished level of cognitive capacity, we performed a set of pairwise comparisons. The comparisons supported this hypothesis. Specifically, owls made significantly more admissions in the morning than they did at night (Ms = 13.70 vs. 9.38, respectively), $F(1, 56) = 9.65$, $p = .003$, $\eta^2 = .15$. In contrast, larks made more admissions at night than they did in the morning (Ms = 10.42 vs. 8.33, respectively), $F(1, 56) = 3.06$, $p = .08$, $\eta^2 = .05$, though this latter comparison was not quite significant. These results suggest that individuals are more likely to offer admissions of wrongdoing during times of diminished cognitive capacity (i.e., owls in the morning; larks in the evening).



FIGURE 1 Values indicate the total number of admissions out of 20 that larks and owls made when tested during the morning or at night. *Note.* $N = 60$. Bars represent ±1 *SD*.

One might argue that the effects involving chronicity and time of day would be limited to transgressions that are not particularly serious or criminal in nature—hence, limiting the external validity of the effect. To examine this possibility, we incorporated the previously assessed perceived seriousness ratings of transgressions into our analysis. Toward this end, we used a mixed-effect logistic regression to model the fixed effects of three factors (i.e., chronicity, time of day, and perceived seriousness) as well as the random effect of the same participant on the odds of offering an admission for each of the interview questions. A SAS PROC GLIMMIX was used because it is appropriate when fitting a generalized linear mixed model to a logistic mixed-effect model. Participants' responses to each interview question comprised the dependent variable. The analysis consisted of three steps—Step 1 included the three predictor variables (chronicity, time of day, and perceived seriousness), Step 2 included all possible two-way interactions, and Step 3 included the three-way interaction. In addition to replicating the results of the analysis of variance, the results of Step 1 provided support for the rational hypothesis that suspects are more inclined to confess to less serious versus more serious transgressions, $F(1, 1139) = 55.22$, $p < .001$, $\beta = -.48$, Odds Ratio (OR) = 0.62; 95% CI (OR) = [.542, .700]. Results of Step 2 replicated the interaction found between chronotype and time of day—and no interactions were observed between either chronotype or time of day and perceived seriousness (both $ps \geq .43$). Results of Step 3 failed to provide evidence of a three-way interaction, $F(1, 1136) = 1.12$, $p = .29$, $\beta = -.29$; $OR = 1.29$; 95% CI (OR) = [0.859, 1.943]: Owls were more likely than larks to confess in the morning for transgressions that were not only low in seriousness (Ms = 6.9 vs. 4.8, respectively) but high in seriousness as well (Ms = 6.8 vs. 3.5, respectively). In short, the predicted and significant Chronicity × Time of Day interaction—that individuals tested during an off-peak hour made more

admissions—was not limited by the perceived seriousness of the crime.

Finally, consistent with past research on the effects of fatigue on temporal discounting (Madon et al., 2013), we found that participants were significantly more inclined to confess in order to avoid an immediate negative consequence during the second half of the interview (Questions 11–20; $M = 5.40$, $SD = 2.24$) than during the first half (Questions 1–10; $M = 4.77$, $SD = 1.97$), $F(1, 56) = 8.00$, $p = .006$, $\eta^2 = .125$. However, no interactions involving interview phase were observed (Fs < 1.26, ps $> .27$). As the two sets of items were equivalent in their perceived seriousness, this pattern further indicates the effect of fatigue on the decision to confess.

DISCUSSION

Over the years, research has shown that both dispositional and situational risk factors increase a suspect's decision to confess (Kassin et al., 2010; Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). The current study advanced the extant literature by identifying a Person × Situation factor—synchronicity—that can have potentially grave consequences in the criminal justice venue. Although qualified by the interaction between chronicity and time of day, we found that owls were more likely to admit to various transgressions using the interrogation-like contingency. This result is consistent with previous research indicating that owls compared to larks are both less conscientious (hence, more likely to transgress) and more impulsive (hence, more likely to make admissions in order to escape). At this point, neither interpretation receives more support than the other. As we had predicted on the basis of research indicating the deleterious influence of cognitive fatigue on decision making, our results supported the asynchrony interaction hypothesis. Specifically, participants who were tested during an "off-peak" period made more admissions of wrongdoing compared to participants tested during an "on-peak" period (i.e., owls in the early morning), although individuals tested during an off-peak evening hour were only marginally more willingly to offer admissions of wrongdoing. Of importance, this interaction was not qualified by the perceived seriousness of the admitted transgressions.

Our results suggest that crime suspects may be at increased risk to confess over time if detained and interrogated by police during off-peak hours of alertness, thereby strengthening the evidence demonstrating the harmful effects of cognitive fatigue on suspects' decision making during interrogations (Davis & Leo, 2012; Kassin et al., 2010; Madon et al., 2013). The significance of the effect thus underscores the potentially potent influence that chronotype asynchronicity may have on a suspect's likelihood of confession and the elevated risk of false confessions. Had we been able to employ a stronger manipulation (e.g., earlier morning and later nighttime hours), one that mirrors the full-time frame during which police often conduct their interrogations (see Kassin et al., 2007) and not limited by ethical considerations, the observed effects on admissions would likely have been stronger.

The effects of cognitive fatigue on suspects' confession decisions are also bolstered by the result indicating that participants were more likely to confess to transgressions appearing in the second half of the list relative to the first half. Although most interrogations tend to last from 30 min to 2 hr (Kassin et al., 2007; Leo, 1996), most proven false confessions, from innocent suspects, were elicited after a mean of 16.3 hr (Drizin & Leo, 2004). Replicating Madon et al. (2013), and demonstrating the importance of interrogation length on a suspect's decision to confess, this finding corroborates naturalistic evidence and provides experimental support for the hypothesis that the length of an interrogation may impair self-regulatory processes (Davis & Leo, 2012) and increase a suspect's willingness to confess as a way to avert an immediate negative consequence.

Although we frame these observed effects in terms of criminal interrogations, the effects that cognitive fatigue have on individuals' willingness to offer admissions could extend to military interrogations. Indeed, military interrogators employ various sleep deprivation techniques similar to being interrogated during off-peak hours both of which engender comparable processes leading to cognitive fatigue (Kassin et al., 2010). Thus, despite the differing dynamics of criminal interrogations and military interrogations, questioning suspects at strategic times (e.g., during off-peak hours, after countless sleepless hours) is likely to have similar consequences for suspects' cognitive ability and, consequently, increase their willingness to offer admissions.

An important limitation of this research warrants mention. Because of the manner in which the data were collected, the ground truth of our participants' individual admissions and denials cannot be known. The possibility that some of these admissions are false is suggested by numerous case studies, as seen in actual DNA exoneration cases involving police-induced compliant false confessions (Innocenceproject.org) as well as laboratory experiments on the role of temporal discounting in false confessions (e.g., Davis & Leo, 2012; Kassin et al., 2010; Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). Nonetheless, examining the ground truth participants' responses in this paradigm is an important issue for future research.

The present results contribute to a growing literature documenting the need for reform to the process of police interrogation. In a white paper on false confessions, Kassin et al. (2010) strongly recommended the

mandatory electronic recording of all suspect interviews and interrogations. They also recommended measures designed to protect vulnerable suspect populations, flexible time limits on the length of interrogation, and the reform of police interrogation tactics—such as banning the false evidence ploy. The present results suggest that the time of day or night during which suspects are questioned—and, hence a suspect's level of off-peak alertness and cognitive fatigue, may also influence the decision to confess. At this point, more research is needed both to replicate this finding in higher stakes laboratory and field settings and perhaps using the computer crash paradigm (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996), the cheating paradigm (Russano, Meissner, Narchet, & Kassin, 2005), and other methods designed to elicit confessions to current and discrete transgressions of consequence.

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APPENDIX
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS USED TO ASSESS ILLEGAL BEHAVIORS

1. Illegally downloaded music, movies, software, or anything else?
2. Tried, used or experimented with any illegal drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, crack, LSD, or any other illegal drug?
3. Been publicly intoxicated?
4. Started or spread a rumor about someone?
5. Ran a red light?
6. Driven a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any other drug like marijuana, cocaine, LSD, etc.?
7. Made a harassing, threatening, or prank phone call or text message?
8. Jumped or cut in line such as at the dining hall, movie theater, or grocery store?
9. Invaded another's privacy such as by reading another's diary, text messages, or e-mails without permission?
10. Engaged in criminal mischief such as a senior prank, egging a house or car, or TP-ing a house?
11. Texted somebody while driving since it became illegal in Michigan?
12. Knowingly kept something of value that you received in error, such as extra change given to you by a cashier or extra merchandise from a store or from an Internet purchase?
13. Failed to wear a seat belt?
14. Purposefully not returned something that you borrowed like a book, clothing, or money?
15. Hunted or fished without a license?
16. Used something that belonged to somebody else without permission, such as something that belonged to a family member, friend, roommate or acquaintance?
17. Transported fireworks across state lines?
18. Cheated on an exam, homework, school project, or helped another person cheat?
19. Bought or held stolen goods worth $25 or more?
20. Drank, bought, or tried to buy alcohol before you were 21?